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fiscal balance in the long run. I believe the current
account adjustment will be fairly slow and orderly,
and that it may not begin for quite some time.
My answer is also based on a simple observa-
tion, which I believe is not widely understood.
For the United States, unlike almost every other
country in the world, a hard-landing process is
inherently self-limiting. U.S. assets owned by
international investors are predominantly denom-
inated in dollars, and a large fraction of U.S.
assets held abroad are denominated in foreign
currencies. Dollar depreciation, should it occur
in a hard-landing process, will be self-limiting
because the dollar value of U.S. assets abroad
will rise, thus improving the U.S. net interna-
tional investment position. Market participants,
knowing this fact, are therefore unlikely to drive
down the foreign currency value of the dollar in
a rapid and disruptive fashion.
I’ll proceed in two steps. First, I’ll explore the
fundamentals of the U.S. position, emphasizing
the central role of international capital flows in
creating the current account deficit. Second, I’ll
develop the theme that the U.S. position is self-
correcting, should a hard-landing process begin.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. Two members of the St. Louis
Fed’s Research Division, Cletus Coughlin, vice
president, and Mike Pakko, senior economist,
provided special assistance. However, I retain
full responsibility for errors.
T
he U.S. current account deficit has
attracted considerable attention from
academics, policymakers and market
participants. So also has the U.S. inter-
national investment position—the difference
between U.S.-owned assets abroad and foreign-
owned assets in the United States. The net posi-
tion has become increasingly negative as current
account deficits have accumulated over time. I
have spoken on international topics several times
in recent years, emphasizing the importance of
international capital flows for explaining the
evolution of the U.S. international accounts. I’ll
review some of my prior analysis today, but want
to concentrate on the question in my title.
The question arises because, at some point in
the future, the world economy will adjust in ways
that yield a smaller U.S. current account deficit.
That we know for certain, because a situation in
which the U.S. net international investment posi-
tion becomes ever more negative as a percentage
of GDP is inconsistent with long-run equilibrium.
So, the question is not whether the U.S. current
account deficit will fall in the future but whether
the inevitable adjustment is likely to be painful
and disruptive of U.S. economic growth and sta-
bility—a hard landing.
My answer is that a hard landing is very
unlikely provided that U.S. monetary and fiscal
authorities maintain sound policies. The Federal
Reserve needs to pursue policies that yield low
inflation and financial stability, and the federal
government needs to pursue policies that yieldPRELIMINARIES
The most widely cited measure of the U.S.
external imbalance is the trade deficit—the differ-
ence between U.S. exports and imports of goods
and services. More generally, it is useful to con-
sider the broader concept of the current account,
which includes current earnings on capital as well
as trade in goods and services. A corresponding
account on the other side of the ledger, known as
the “capital and financial account,” measures
the international flow of capital assets. Putting
aside errors and omissions in the data, a current
account deficit is necessarily equal to a capital
account surplus. A country in this position—
like the United States today—is exporting more
capital claims than it is importing. Put another
way, international investors are bringing more
capital to the United States than U.S. investors
are sending abroad.
A common mistake is to treat international
capital flows as though they are passively respond-
ing to what is happening in the current account.
The current account deficit, some say, is financed
by U.S. borrowing abroad. In fact, international
investors buy U.S. assets not for the purpose of
financing the U.S. current account deficit but
because they believe these are sound investments
promising a good combination of safety and
return. Moreover, many of these investments
have nothing whatsoever to do with borrowing
in the conventional meaning of the word, but
instead involve purchases of land, businesses,
and common stock in the United States. Foreign
auto companies, for example, have purchased
land and built manufacturing plants in the United
States. Clearly, foreign auto producers have estab-
lished these facilities because of the prospective
returns from building vehicles in the United
States and not for the purpose of financing the
U.S. current account deficit. This simple example
should make clear that a careful analysis of the
nature of international capital flows is necessary
before offering judgments about risks posed by
the U.S. current account deficit.
RECENT TRENDS IN THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
POSITION
The capital account measures asset flows of
a country for a given period, such as a year. For
the United States, the capital account includes
the accumulation of foreign assets by U.S. resi-
dents as well as the accumulation of U.S. assets
by foreigners.
As trade and commerce around the world
have grown increasingly integrated—the process
often referred to as “globalization”—the growth
of cross-border financial flows has become par-
ticularly prominent. For example, foreign owner-
ship of U.S. assets increased by an average of
$155 billion per year during the 1980s. For the
years 2000 through 2004, foreign ownership of
U.S. assets increased at an average rate of $991
billion per year—more than a six-fold increase.
In 2004, over $1.4 trillion of U.S. assets were
purchased by foreign entities.1
U.S. ownership of foreign assets has shown
similar growth. Averaging $95 billion per year
during the 1980s, U.S. entities have accumulated
foreign assets at an average rate of $484 billion
per year over the past five years. Over the entire
span of this comparison, accumulation of U.S.
assets by international investors has outpaced
the U.S. accumulation of foreign assets—a capital
account surplus that has moved our country from
a positive to a negative net asset position.
Prior to 1989, the United States had had a
positive net international investment position
since World War I. As a consequence of large
capital inflows in the 1990s, the United States
today has the world’s largest negative net inter-
national investment position. By the end of 2004,
foreigners owned more than $12.5 trillion of U.S.
assets, based on market values, while U.S.-owned
assets abroad reached a level of just under $10
trillion. Hence, at the end of last year, the U.S.
net international investment position was minus
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1 Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, as reported in the U.S. International Investment Position tables. Direct investment is meas-
ured at market value.$2.5 trillion, amounting to over 20 percent of
U.S. GDP.
In today’s world, with electronic funds trans-
fers, financial derivatives and largely unrestricted
capital flows, investors have a global marketplace
in which to seek profitable returns and diversify
risk. In such an environment, we should consider
the possibility that aggregate patterns of inter-
national trade flows may be the by-product of a
process through which financial resources are
seeking their most efficient allocations in a world-
wide capital market. That is, instead of thinking
that capital flows are financing the current account
deficit, it may well be that the trade deficit is
driven by—is financing, so to speak—capital
flows determined by investors seeking the best
combination of risk and return in the international
capital market. The mechanism creating this
outcome is that capital inflows keep the dollar
stronger than it otherwise would be, tending to
boost imports and suppress exports, thus leading
to a current account deficit.
While the conclusion that the current account
is financing the capital account is surely an over-
statement, because capital and trade flows are
jointly determined, it is worth emphasizing that
capital flows are a highly dynamic feature of the
world economy. Capital flows are driven by a
number of economic forces which are not fully
understood, especially at a quantitative level. The
“home bias” of investors, which has led them to
invest in their home countries rather than seek
optimal international diversification, has proba-
bly been diminishing and, as a consequence,
investors everywhere are increasingly investing
outside their home countries. Countries with
rapidly aging populations, especially Japan and
Western European ones, may be saving and invest-
ing in the United States against the day when
their populations will be drawing down assets to
support retired citizens. Because the United
States economy has been growing at a faster pace
than most high-income counties, investment
returns from U.S. operations have tended to
exceed those abroad, thus encouraging capital
flows to the United States.
As many have commented, the capital inflow
may also reflect the low saving rate in the United
States. However, the U.S. saving rate should not
be viewed in isolation: Ben Bernanke—a former
Fed Governor, current Chairman of the President’s
Council of Economic Advisors and President
Bush’s nominee to succeed Alan Greenspan as
Federal Reserve Chairman—has persuasively
argued that an unusually high level of worldwide
savings relative to investment opportunities has
resulted in downward pressure on world interest
rates.2 Investors everywhere seek the best combi-
nation of investment return and security, and they
have brought abundant capital to the United
States because the profitability and security of
U.S. investment opportunities make the United
States something of an oasis of prosperity and
stability.
Some of these economic forces may tend to
reduce U.S. capital inflows in the future. For
example, as portfolios become more internation-
ally diversified, the incentive for investors
abroad to move capital to the United States will
diminish. Aging populations may increase pur-
chases of U.S. goods with their accumulated
assets. The net of these economic forces in the
future may tend to either appreciate or depreci-
ate the value of the dollar on foreign exchange
markets.
But one thing is clear: Changes in investor
attitudes and expectations can alter capital flows
quickly and force changes in the trade account.
From this perspective, which I have called the
“international capital markets view,” international
asset markets play a central role. Capital flows,
determined by the motivations of foreign and
domestic investors, are a driving force. We should
think of capital flows as the equilibrium outcome
of investors worldwide seeking to acquire port-
folios that balance risk and return through
diversification.
When we bear this perspective in mind—
that international capital flows are determined
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2 Bernanke (2005).by investors’ efforts to allocate their capital most
efficiently and not by passive financing of the
current account—prospects for a painful current
account adjustment in the future seem less likely.
The fundamental economic determinants of cap-
ital flows are unlikely to change quickly and
massively, and therefore capital flows themselves
are unlikely to change quickly and massively.
A CONSIDERATION OF THE
POTENTIAL DANGERS
The potential dangers of current account
adjustments can be viewed from a number of
perspectives. As we consider some of these sce-
narios, the international capital markets view
will serve to counter some of the concerns.
Many of those who predict adverse conse-
quences of a current account reversal emphasize
the risk of a dramatic depreciation of the dollar
on foreign exchange markets. If this decline were
to take place suddenly, resulting in disorderly
markets, a financial-market induced recession
might ensue. To properly evaluate the likelihood
of this kind of worst-case scenario, we need to
consider some alternative views of the forces
driving the U.S. current account deficit in the
first place.
From a trade deficit view, which I do not
share, depreciation of the dollar on foreign
exchange markets might be seen as necessary to
resolve the excess of U.S. imports over exports.
On this view, either the United States will run a
persistently widening current account deficit, or
we are destined to face some combination of a
depreciating currency and/or lower GDP growth.
If we look at the situation from the opposite direc-
tion, however, we might note that the recent his-
torical trend of a widening U.S. current account
deficit has taken place in an environment in which
U.S. GDP growth has been, on average, higher
than growth in much of the rest of the world.
Indeed, we did see some depreciation of the
dollar from early 2002 through 2004, by a bit
less than 30 percent as measured by the major-
currencies trade-weighted index. However, the
index has rebounded by about 6 percent so far in
2005. The depreciation, on balance, since 2002
has made U.S. exports more competitive and has
led to some price increases in U.S. imports. These
are the types of adjustments that take place in
market economies in response to evolving supply
and demand conditions. The recent depreciation
of the dollar can be seen as part of the normal
adjustment process of the economy, and markets
have not shown any signs of becoming disorderly.
An emphasis on savings and investment as
drivers of international capital flows appears
incomplete and not completely in accord with
recent facts. What is needed, I believe, is a more
explicit focus on the unique role of U.S. financial
markets in the world economy.
THE U.S. ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS
The globalization of financial markets—
spurred by technological advances and liberaliza-
tion of capital flow restrictions worldwide—has
created entirely new investment opportunities
for investors in both the United States and abroad.
These new opportunities have undoubtedly
given rise to a re-balancing of portfolios, and
there are reasons to believe that this process
might be associated with a net export of claims
on U.S. assets, yielding a current account deficit.
U.S. financial markets are among the most
highly developed in the world, offering efficiency,
transparency and liquidity. The U.S. dollar serves
as both a medium of exchange and a unit of
account in many international transactions.
These factors make dollar-denominated claims
attractive assets in any international portfolio.
No capital market in the world has a combination
of strengths superior to that of the United States.
Our advantages include the promise of a good
return, safety, secure political institutions, liquid-
ity and an enormous depth of financial expertise.
For some purposes, it is useful to think of U.S.
financial markets as serving as a world financial
intermediary. Just as a bank, or a mutual fund,
channels the savings of many individuals toward
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kets play a similar role for many investors from
around the world. In the process, individuals,
companies, and governments accumulate dollar-
denominated assets to serve as a vehicle for facil-
itating transactions and storing liquid wealth
safely.
A bank earns its return on capital by paying
a lower interest rate to depositors than it earns
on its assets. Similarly, the United States earns a
higher return on its investments abroad than for-
eigners do on their investments in the United
States. Despite the fact that the U.S. international
investment position at the end of 2004 was –$2.5
trillion, U.S. net income in 2004 on its invest-
ments abroad slightly exceeded income payments
on foreign-owned assets in the United States.
This pattern has been the norm for a number of
years but, obviously, the net income flow will
become negative if the U.S. net international
investment position becomes sufficiently negative.
How is the United States able to earn a sig-
nificantly higher return on its assets abroad than
foreigners earn on their assets in the United States?
Consider currency, which pays a zero return. A
remarkable fact is that about half the total amount
of U.S. currency outstanding is circulating abroad.
Another fact is that much of the foreign holding
of U.S. debt is in the form of Treasury bills and
other debt instruments, while U.S. residents hold
a much larger share of their assets abroad in the
form of equities, thus earning an equity premium.
More generally, many private and govern-
mental investors abroad rely on the U.S. capital
market as the best place to invest in extremely
safe and highly liquid securities. Along a spec-
trum of safety and liquidity, these assets include
currency, U.S. government obligations, agency
debt, and corporate bonds. U.S. equity markets
are also highly liquid. The United States as a
whole earns a return from providing these safe
and liquid investments to the world. The desire
of foreigners to hold U.S. Treasury securities is a
testament to the confidence that the world has in
the safety and soundness of our financial system.
Part of the reason U.S. capital markets have
unrivaled strength in the world economy is that
U.S. financial institutions provide services of
extremely high quality. In the detailed trade
accounts, we see that the United States has a lop-
sided trade advantage in financial services. In
2004, U.S. exports of financial services amounted
to $21.9 billion, against imports of such services
of only $5.0 billion. Another line in the table of
trade statistics tells the same story: business,
professional and technical services yielded U.S.
export earnings in 2004 of $33.8 billion as against
imports of such services $12.5 billion. Some of
these services, such as legal and accounting
services, are closely connected to success in
financial services trade.
HOW DANGEROUS IS THE U.S.
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT?
In light of these considerations, let us return
to our question: How dangerous is the U.S. cur-
rent account deficit? The first thing to note is
that many of the economic forces driving capital
flows are very long term. Portfolio reallocations
occur as home bias declines, but over years rather
than quarters. Firms build operations in other
countries based on plans extending many years
in the future. Demographic developments unfold
over decades. What may appear to be an imbal-
ance from a short-run perspective may make per-
fect sense over a long-term horizon.
To the extent that adjustment of the current
account will involve changes in the foreign
exchange value of the dollar, it is quite likely
that such changes will take place gradually over
time in orderly markets. There is no inherent
reason that such changes would lead to a financial
market crisis; as a stable, diversified and growing
economy, the United States is not likely to suffer
from a sudden lack of confidence by investors.
Of course, sustained confidence does depend on
sound economic policies, as I have already
emphasized.
It is sometimes said that the United States
has become a “net debtor” nation, and that this
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ciation might lead to financial crisis. Indeed,
with a current account deficit amounting to 6
percent of GDP and a negative net international
investment position over 20 percent of GDP, some
have drawn comparisons with countries such as
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and other countries
that at times have experienced severe balance-
of-payments crises. I consider it highly unlikely
that such a crisis will befall the United States.
The word “debtor” is extremely misleading
in this context, for the U.S. assets owned by for-
eigners include equities and physical capital
located in the United States, in addition to bonds
issued by U.S. entities. Moreover, the part of the
U.S. international financial position that is debt,
by which I mean bonds and other fixed claims
such as bank loans, is predominantly denomi-
nated in dollars. In fact, about 95 percent of
international claims on the United States are
denominated in dollars. A country with most of
its debt denominated in its own currency is in a
very different situation from one whose debt is
denominated in other currencies. The familiar
crises experienced by several Asian countries in
1997-1998, by Mexico on several occasions, and
by numerous other countries have all involved
situations in which the impacted countries have
had large external debts denominated in foreign
currencies.
In these previous crisis scenarios, the foreign
denomination of domestic debt had important
destabilizing consequences. Consider what typi-
cally happens to a country suffering a balance-
of-payments crisis. As the foreign exchange value
of its currency depreciates, the value of its foreign
liabilities—in terms of domestic purchasing
power—increases, as does the burden of servicing
its international debt. Recognizing this implica-
tion of a crisis, international investors respond
by paring back their positions further, engender-
ing even greater currency depreciation. Hence,
the combination of foreign-denominated debt
and a depreciating currency has proven to be
something of a vicious circle—compounding
and accelerating a crisis.
The U.S. situation is completely different. To
the extent that the foreign exchange value of the
dollar declines, the effect on the values of U.S.
and foreign asset holdings works not as an accel-
erator of crisis, but as part of a self-correcting
mechanism. Dollar-denominated U.S. liabilities
remain unchanged in domestic value, which
means that debt service in dollars and relative to
the size of the U.S. economy does not change.
Moreover, holdings of U.S. investors abroad,
about two-thirds of which are denominated in
foreign currencies, appreciate in dollar terms.
The composition of the U.S. international invest-
ment account, therefore, contributes to stability
rather than to instability.
The significant quantitative importance of
exchange rate changes on the U.S. net interna-
tional investment position can be illustrated by
examining specific periods in which the dollar
appreciated or depreciated. Consider the years
2002-2004, during which the Fed’s major curren-
cies trade-weighted exchange rate index depreci-
ated by nearly 27 percent. Associated with the
current account deficits during this period were
financial flows into the United States totaling
$1.6 trillion. However, because foreign claims on
U.S. assets are denominated in dollars to a far
greater extent than U.S. claims on foreign assets,
the depreciation increased the dollar value of U.S.
assets abroad relative to foreign assets in the
United States. The total valuation impact stem-
ming from exchange rate changes was $919.0 bil-
lion, which was 57 percent of the net financial
flows. For this three-year period, the U.S. net
international investment position decreased by
$202.8 billion, but absent the exchange rate
adjustment, the position would have decreased
by more than $1.1 trillion.
Now consider the years 1999-2001, to illus-
trate the impact of an appreciating dollar. During
this period, the Fed’s major currencies trade-
weighted exchange rate index showed a dollar
appreciation of nearly 15 percent. Net financial
flows into the United States totaled $1.1 trillion.
Meanwhile, the total valuation impact of the
appreciating dollar was a negative $548.2 billion,
which is nearly half the size of the net financial
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international investment position decreased by
$1.3 trillion. Absent the exchange rate adjustment,
the decrease would have been $684.4 billion.
However, the negative international investment
position did not threaten to cause dollar depreci-
ation; instead, causation went the other way, as
dollar appreciation caused a significant increase
in the negative net investment position.
The effects of changes in the foreign exchange
value of the dollar on the U.S. net international
investment position serve to stabilize the inter-
national sector of the U.S. economy. Clearly, as
the previous illustrations show, it is a mistake to
ignore valuation changes because they are not
insignificant compared to the annual financial
flows that are the counterpart of the current
account deficit.
Certain other industrialized economies have
incurred much larger external obligations as a
percent of GDP without precipitating crises. For
example, Australia’s negative net investment
position reached 60 percent of GDP in the mid-
1990s, Ireland’s exceeded 70 percent in the 1980s,
and New Zealand accumulated a position amount-
ing to nearly 90 percent of GDP in the late 1990s.
Notably, these economies have recently been
among the most successful—in terms of eco-
nomic growth—in the industrialized world. The
combination of rising external obligations and
prospects for robust growth is entirely consistent
with the view of the capital account I have dis-
cussed today. Capital flows to countries that can
make productive use of it. Capital inflow is a
symptom of good growth prospects and an aid to
growth rather than an impediment.
A recent study by Federal Reserve economists
at the Board of Governors buttresses this view.3
The authors of the study—Croke, Kamin, and
Leduc—systematically examined examples of
developed industrial nations that have experi-
enced current account “reversals.” They found
that such reversals have typically been benign:
among those countries that experienced the largest
declines in growth during the adjustment period,
cyclical considerations appeared to be an impor-
tant factor. Moreover, these cases were generally
not associated with significant exchange rate
depreciations. Among those cases where coun-
tries weathered the adjustment while experienc-
ing increasing economic growth, exchange rate
adjustments were an important factor in reducing
current account deficits—primarily by raising
export growth rather than lowering imports. In
these cases, the exchange rate depreciation evi-
dently played a role in buffering those economies
against adverse growth consequences.
These findings provide little evidence in
support of the disorderly markets scenario and
are entirely consistent with the view I have
emphasized. To be sure, no country can perma-
nently incur rising levels of net external obliga-
tions relative to GDP. If sustained indefinitely,
service payments on ever-increasing obligations
would ultimately exceed national income. Long
before that situation of literal insolvency occurred,
however, market forces would drive changes in
exchange rates, interest rate differentials and rel-
ative growth rates in such a way to move the
economy toward a sustainable path. Nevertheless,
such adjustments need not be sudden, large or
disruptive as they have sometimes been for coun-
tries with severe balance-of-payments crises.
The international capital markets view sug-
gests that the United States is more like those
countries that have experienced high levels of
debt without obvious ill effects than those that
have suffered crises. Moreover, the U.S. case is
unique in a number of respects. The central role
of U.S. financial markets—and of the dollar—in
the world economy suggests that capital account
surpluses, and therefore current account deficits,
are being driven primarily by foreign demand for
U.S. assets rather than by any structural imbalance
in the U.S. economy itself.
The situation facing the United States is
deeply different from that facing nations that
have experienced painful current account adjust-
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3 Croke, Kamin, and Leduc (2005).ments. But while the U.S. situation might be quite
distinctive, it would be a mistake to think that
the United States is in completely uncharted
waters; as noted, other prosperous countries
have had large negative international investment
positions without getting into trouble, and the
United States itself was in this position for
decades prior to World War I.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The international financial markets view of
U.S. international capital account determination
that I have described today highlights the dynamic
role of international capital adjustments as
investors exploit the opportunities of globalized
financial markets. Because the technological
progress and capital-market liberalizations that
have driven this process have evolved over time,
the process has been protracted. Ultimately, how-
ever, when portfolio adjustments have optimally
exploited new diversification opportunities, and
as growth abroad rises, the net international
investment position of the United States will sta-
bilize. So also, over time, will the current account
deficit decline to sustainable levels.
If the capital markets view is correct—and I
obviously think it is—the forces driving the U.S.
capital account represent a persistent, but ulti-
mately temporary, process that might result in a
higher negative level of net claims without nec-
essarily posing any threat to the long-run sustain-
ability of the U.S. current account. Nor will the
transition to a sustainable long-run path neces-
sarily require wrenching adjustments in domestic
or international markets or in exchange rates.
We can all benefit from our good fortune in
having access to increasingly safe, liquid and
transparent financial markets. The United States
has created for itself a comparative advantage in
capital markets, and we should not be surprised
that investors all over the world come to buy the
product.
REFERENCES
Bernanke, Ben S. “The Global Saving Glut and the
U.S. Current Account Deficit.” Homer Jones Lecture,
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, April 14, 2005.
Croke, Hilary; Kamin, Steven B. and Leduc, Sylvain.
“Financial Market Developments and Economic
Activity during Current Account Adjustments in
Industrial Economies.” International Finance
Discussion Paper Number 827, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, February 2005.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE
8